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THE REASON FOR FOLLOWING: 
MORAL INTEGRITY AND THE 
CHRISTOLOGICAL SUMMONS 
William Schweiker 
This article offers a constructive argument in Christian moral philosophy by 
way of engaging and assessing Robert Scharlemann's recent and decidedly 
Protestant proposal to have isolated a unique form of reason manifest in 
Christ's call to follow him. Scharlemann relates "the reason of following" to 
other forms of human reason and also modes of thinking. In this way, he 
hopes to specify the unique contribution of Christian thought to philosophical 
inquiry about human being in the world, and also to clarify meaning and truth 
of Christian convictions. In assessing this novel proposal, the article situates 
the argument within historic options in Christian thought and then isolates a 
lacuna in Scharlemann's argument that threatens the entire project. The prob-
lem centers on the relation among forms of reason with respect to the human 
struggle for wholeness in life. In order to address this problem, the article 
introduces the idea of "moral integrity" as a concept needed to articulate the 
reason for following. By clarifying this idea and its relation to the reign of 
God, the article specifies the unique task and possibility of contemporary 
Christian moral philosophy. 
Philosophical theology is enjoying renewed life. Developments in Anglo-
American thought represented by such different thinkers as Alvin 
Plantinga, Philip Quinn, William P. Alston and others signal the vitality of 
current philosophical reflection on theological claims. A similar resur-
gence of interest in religious topics is found among Continental thinkers 
ranging from French post-structuralists like Jacques Derrida in his The Gift 
of Death to new trends within phenomenology led by figures as different as 
Jean-Luc Marion and the late Emmanuel Levinas. And as I argue through-
out this essay, there are important, if often neglected, contributions to 
philosophical theology from the perspective of Protestant theology. New 
thought is afoot despite the predictions just a few decades ago of the death 
of philosophical theology. In this situation, one is reminded of Mark 
Twain's famous remark about news of his own demise. The reports of this 
death have been greatly exaggerated! 
There are of course many reasons for the resurgence of philosophical 
reflection on religious topics and theological claims. And there were many 
reasons, some good and others not, why theologians critical of "natural the-
ology" and cultural commentators assuming the triumph of secularization 
published reports of the death of philosophical theology. That being said, it 
is probably the case that the deepest reason for the current upsurge in philo-
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sophical theology is a widespread cultural shift. The noted Polish poet and 
essayist Czeslaw Milosz has written that the dominance of materialistic phi-
losophy in this age means that the "simplest religious ideas" are "as diffi-
cult to comprehend as the highest mathematics and that they had been 
transformed into a kind of gnosis.") Milosz wonders if only elites can 
understand profound religious ideas. The pervasive inarticulacy about reli-
gious matters in the cultures of high modernity has, ironically enough, 
made it possible and even necessary to think about religious topics and the-
ological claims philosophically. Such thinking ought to counter the igno-
rance of the culture while (hopefully) avoiding an invidious elitism about 
religious convictions. One needs to use every source possible, including reli-
gious ones, to advance the project of understanding. And this is true, so it 
seems, both inside and outside religious communities. Who really imagines 
that inarticulacy about the meaning of basic ideas is any less profound with-
in communities of faith than outside their boundaries? 
My purpose in this essay is more focused than these widespread and all 
too amorphous cultural trends that seem to have provoked renewed labor 
in philosophical theology. In the following pages I intend to explore and 
then transform radically the recent proposal by Robert Scharlemann for 
isolating a distinct form of reason called acoluthetic or christological reason. 
Scharlemann's astOnishing claim is that Christian faith reveals a hitherto 
unidentified form of human reason. Scharlemann lets the symbol of 
Christ's call to "follow me" give rise to thought, to borrow a well-known 
phrase from Paul Ricoeur. The structure and principles of thinking are 
manifest in linguistic and symbolic forms that must be analyzed in order to 
articulate that structure and those principles. 
I intend to bring to light how indebted Scharlemann's argument about 
christological reason is to one strand of Christian thought, specifically tra-
ditional Lutheran theology. This will enable us to grasp the symbolic 
framework consistent with the structure and principles of reason 
Scharlemann strives to articulate. The exercise of isolating the theological 
lineage of the argument does not itself determine criteria for the assess-
ment of his work. Yet it does provide context for understanding 
Scharlemann's argument. And in this way I also suggest that there are 
important, if forgotten, resources in Protestantism to aid work in philo-
sophical theology.' But I intend to engage Scharlemann's work in order to 
serve my own constructive purposes. So, let me begin, then, by clarifying 
the central argument of this essay and also indicating the perspective from 
which I want to engage Scharlemann's work. 
Reason And Wholeness 
According to Robert Scharlemann's, acoluthetic reason, the reason of fol-
lowing, is given its simplest expression in Christ's summons "Follow me!" 
In responding obediently to that call, the I, finding itself ecstatically outside 
of itself in another, nevertheless comes to itself. "The acoluthetic sum-
mons," Scharlemann further contends, "is the call to be in the world freely; 
it is the call of the voice of freedom in finitude, of freedom to be in the 
world wholly."3 The reason for following, that is, the rationality of disciple-
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ship, is that in the acoluthetic summons I am called to my own most 
authentic freedom and peace or wholeness. If I read Scharlemann correct-
ly, we are not justified in adopting any specific summons to follow a per-
son, project, or value scheme in our self-understanding unless in principle 
it contributes to freedom and wholeness. This freedom and wholeness is 
the meaning of what is good and right for the human self. The christologi-
cal summons is defined by its capacity so to constitute life, and that is what 
differentiates it from all other claims to our trust and loyalty. A summons 
to follow is known as distinctly christological by its benefit for human life. 
Scharlemann's claim, then, is that a unique form of reason is revealed in 
the summons of Christ to follow him. The reason of following is salvific 
and empancipatory. Reason, as Scharlemann defines it, is a way of relating 
self and other. And in this case, reason constitutes the self in its own peace 
and enables it to live in the world in freedom but in another, in Christ. In 
making this claim, Scharlemann further insists that the self has spatial and 
temporal location. Freedom in finitude is always somewhere; it is not 
worldless. Thus, it is necessary to examine not only "when" but also 
"where" the peace or wholeness of the self is located, the place of the good. 
The location of the ecstatic self is formulated by Scharlemann along tradi-
tional Protestant theological lines: the "place" of human wholeness is noth-
ing less than the christo logical message. The peace or wholeness of the self 
is not of the world even though the self is free to be in the world wholly. 
The Christian exists in the Gospel. 
While Scharlemann's argument centers on the freedom of the self, the 
idea of "wholeness" in fact remains oddly undeveloped in the text. More 
correctly put, Scharlemann seems to equate ideas of "wholeness" and 
"peace" and understand them to designate the unity of the self with pure 
subjectivity, the "I." In relating itself to the "I" presented in the christologi-
cal summons as other than self, the living individual enacts the unity of its 
particular, actual existence with selfhood as such. Wholeness is then 
another way of affirming a principle of identity, that is, I am I. It is at this 
point that I intend to make a radical transformation in Scharlemann's argu-
ment, or, perhaps better, to chart new constructive directions in thinking 
about our lives as moral and religious creatures. 
In my judgment, Scharlemann's account of "wholeness" needs clarifica-
tion and expansion in order to avoid being self-refuting. Without clarifying 
the relation between christological reason and the other forms of reason in 
terms of what constitutes human wholeness, the position risks incoherence 
insofar as one would have to empty freedom of any substantive relation to 
our finite existence. Making this point will require that I explore in due 
course his account of the forms of reason. But my contention is that on 
purely systematic grounds the "wholeness" of the self cannot be adequate-
ly understood without reference to the goods entailed in the various other 
forms of reason, goods that Scharlemann sadly does not explore. To deny 
this claim is to court the possibility that the christological summons is self-
mutilating. In the name of freedom it would enact the denial of the basic 
human goods of the other forms of reason rather than affirming and even 
transforming those goods. Put otherwise, is Scharlemann's argument any 
different, in principle, than the kinds of mid-twentieth century existential-
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ist theology, found in (say) Rudolf Bulbnann, which focused on the radical 
act of free choice to constitute the self in a crisis of decision? In that case, 
we have no reason for following, even on Scharlemann's terms. And this is 
so, since per definition christo logical reason is about being freely and wholly 
in the world. In the face of this problem, I hope to sustain the claim that the 
christological summons requires a commitment to the reign of God with 
respect to the complexity of goods that characterize finite life. That is the 
reason why we ought to heed the summons of Christ. 
In order to conceptualize such a robust value-laden form of human 
wholeness, I will shortly develop the idea of moral integrity.4 The idea of 
moral integrity articulates the obvious meaning of "wholeness," which is 
Scharlemann's concern, since the person, or community, of integrity is at 
one with itself with respect to principles and commibnents basic to what 
life is believed to be about. But the idea of moral integrity also forces us to 
consider the norm for what actually constitutes human wholeness with 
respect to our lives and commitments in this world. In developing the idea 
of moral integrity my intention is, then, to draw on Scharlemann's insights 
in the service of a quite different trajectory of ethical reflection and philo-
sophical theology.5 
Before turning to the idea of moral integrity and Scharlemann's text a 
further preliminary comment is now in order. From what perspective can 
one best engage Scharlemann's work? In my judgment the most salient 
and critical question to ask about Scharlemann's project arises from within 
ethics. Moral reflection is especially concerned with the problem of how 
we should live and thus with reasons for adopting any way of life. Any 
summons to "follow me!" can, and must, be met by the question "why?" 
And any valid answer to that question must be made in terms of what is 
good and right wherein "good" and "right" are ethically specified and val-
idated. Of course, one could argue that that call of Christ confronts us as a 
radical demand for obedience rather than instigating as well the possibility 
of critical reflection. But that claim, surely dogmatic and not textual, is 
itself debatable and potentially dangerous. 6 Thus, I am interested not sim-
ply in the reason of following, but, rather, the reason for following. Stated 
otherwise, responding to Scharlemann's work from the perspective of 
moral inquiry helpfully raises the question of what kind of "reason" is at 
stake in Christian philosophical theology. And we will see it opens reflec-
tion on a range of natural goods that a properly Christian account of rea-
son must sustain and further. 
Given Scharlemann's emphaSis on freedom and wholeness, I must chart 
the connection between ethics and philosophical theology.7 This is a con-
nection important for many recent "continental" voices interested in philo-
sophical theology. Marion speaks of the God beyond being; Levinas insists 
on God as a "trace" within the encounter of self and other. Even within the 
Anglo-American discussion there is interest among philosophical theolo-
gians in such things as divine command ethics and virtue theory. But oddly 
enough, the ethical is a difficult point of view from which to engage 
Scharlemann's argument. It is not clear what the undertaking of ethics 
attentive to theological questions would entail from his perspective. For 
Scharlemann, Christian moral philosophy, it would seem, must be either a 
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form of ethics, and thus an exercise of pure practical reason, or if one insists 
on the theological dimension it becomes a mode of thinking, presumably 
about the divine good." Is Christian moral philosophy an oxymoron? Must 
it be defined either as a form of ethics, in which case it is a purely philo-
sophical undertaking, or as a mode of theological thinking and thereby 
have its connection with moral philosophy severed? What concepts could 
Christian moral philosophy use and what would be its subject matter? 
It is not my intention in this essay to work through these systematic and 
conceptual problems. I do judge that such an ethics is, at least in principle 
if not always in practice, both a mode of theological thinking and also a 
form of moral philosophy. It is one way to practice the labor of philosophi-
cal theology. And in fact the idea of moral integrity as I intend to develop it 
articulates the crossing point of theological thinking and practical reason. 
It helps to provide the conceptual means for interpreting faith in God with 
respect to the being of moral agents in a world of values and relations. In 
this respect, the idea of moral integrity specifies an account of human exis-
tence that remains unexplored in Scharlemann's work; it articulates in nuce 
the subject matter of Christian moral philosophy. Moral integrity articu-
lates the meaning of Christian faith in the realm of the moral life and 
denotes the relation of human beings and the rest of the wide compass of 
life to God. It is from this standpoint, the standpoint of moral integrity as 
faithful and rational existence, that my argument is made. 9 
That said, I turn now to the idea of moral integrity since it is the concep-
tual core of my present argument. With conceptual clarity in hand, I will 
turn, second, to isolate historical differences within Christian theology on 
reason, freedom, and wholeness. These first two sections of this essay pro-
vide the conceptual and historical framework within which to engage 
Scharlemann's text. Exploring his work is the subject of the third section of 
the essay. We will see that it expresses in contemporary terms a theme of 
Protestant, especially Lutheran, theology. Christian righteousness is alien. 
The Christian exists in an other, in Christ. This is the forgotten insight of 
Protestant Christianity important for contemporary philosophical theology 
with all of its interest in the "other" and the "ethical." I conclude the essay 
by returning to the theme of moral integrity in order to specify its import 
for christological reason in conjunction with the other forms of reason. At 
that point I hope to show how the idea of moral integrity provides a need-
ed concept for reflection on human life.lO 
The Idea Of Moral Integrity 
A number of thinkers aside from Scharlemann have directed our attention 
to the unique spatiality of human existence. Charles Taylor, for instance, 
has recently argued that human beings exist in a moral space of life 
constituted by questions about how to live. What is more, we orient our-
selves in life with respect to some implicit or explicit idea of the good. ll We 
live within contexts in which things matter and judgments must be made 
about how to conduct life with respect to what matters. The commitments 
and values persons and communities hold provide a moral framework 
within which questions about how to live are assessed, criticized, revised, 
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and, finally, answered. Without those commitments and our interactions 
with others it is not clear that we would have any sense of who we are. 
The place of human existence, "where" I am, to use Scharlemann's terms, 
is always a space defined by questions about how to live and commitments 
about what is and ought to be valued in human life. This is simply to say 
that human life transpires in regions of care, choice, and freedom with 
respect to relations, needs, and conditions that sustain and limit human 
action. Even the christological summons is an instance of this point: the 
summons "Follow me!" requires some response, some choice. The sum-
mons reveals the ground of freedom: Follow mel-if you will. The hearer 
is always free to do otherwise than follow. This freedom is not devoid of 
orienting values, however. If it were, life would be chaotic; we would 
make no graduations of value in deciding freely what to be and to do. But 
of course we make all kinds of decisions. And this is merely to say, again, 
that some explicit or implicit acknowledgement of values we want to ori-
ent our lives is basic to purposeful behavior. This fact tells us something 
essential about what it means to be a person.12 
Given that the conditions of human freedom and choice are 
always bound to what we care about and so some orienting goods, it is not 
at all surprising that a strand of Western thought, a strand that feeds into 
Scharlemann's work, is worried about the ways in which one become lost 
in the daily cares of life. People can become preoccupied with the needs of 
the day and virtually lose themselves in their demands. It is this loss of self 
into mundane cares and commitments that has troubled some thinkers. 
From Socrates to the Hebrew prophets, from Kierkegaard to Heidegger, 
some seek to call the self back to itself. As Scharlemann writes about chris-
tological reason, "The 'Follow me!' calls the hearers to disengage them-
selves from the cares of being in the world."B Does this negate the fact that 
we exist in a space of questions with respect to what we care about, some 
idea of the good? Is the freedom of christological reason an act of the pure 
"I" devoid of relation to the values and goods entailed in the other forms of 
reason that structure our being in the world? Actually, the longstanding 
criticism of the possible loss of self into the everyday world is not about the 
fact that we care, but, rather, those things about which we care. The criti-
cism articulates an orienting good, namely, the care for authentic existence. 
Authenticity-truthfulness to self-becomes the orienting good for the line 
of thought Scharlemann represents.14 But this merely confirms that the 
coherence and meaning of various ways of life and projects is inseparable 
from a growld commitment to some idea of the good basic to a sense of 
what life is about. To borrow from Paul Tillich, a thinker who deeply 
influenced Scharlemann, all human beings have some concern, even ulti-
mate concern, that is basic to the meaning and value of their lives. IS The 
point of the criticism of human care is to focus attention on what ought to 
be our ground projects, our basic concerns. 
Attention to the moral space of life as a domain of ethics departs from 
Scharlemann's work. For him, like Kant and many others, ethics is only 
about duties to others rooted in the demand of respect for persons; it is the 
work of (pure) practical reason. Given this, the ground projects, the orient-
ing commitment and good of our lives is oddly enough not a matter of 
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moral reflection, unless, of course, the good will can itself be defined as an 
orienting good. J6 Of course all of this doubt about what to call reflection on 
orienting goods may be quibbling over terms. The point, in my judgment, 
is that it is possible and necessary to articulate and criticize people's 
ground projects in order that those projects can be evaluated and revised 
with respect to the demands of life. Whether we call this enterprise 
"ethics" or not is of secondary importance, although, I judge, it is best to 
see these as basic moral questions. The reason for calling it "ethics" is that 
in doing so we warrant specific criteria for evaluating commitments; we 
are compelled to evaluate commitments about the good with respect to 
their validity for personal and social actions and relations. And we also 
can insist that our encounters with others and duties to them only make 
sense within some construal of what life is about, and that any construal 
entails, at least implicitly, some idea of goodness used to orient human per-
sonal and social life. By isolating the idea of "wholeness" basic to 
Scharlemann's account of christological reason as true freedom, I am, 
therefore, bringing to light the orienting good of his position. The question 
is how that good relates to the goods implied in the other forms of reason. 
This relation between the coherence and meaning of human life with 
respect to some basic commitment or ground project is precisely what the 
idea of moral integrity conveys. As John Kekes notes, "fI]ntegrity is a com-
plex notion. In one of its senses, it is principled action; in another, it is 
wholeness."J7 Of course, a person or community can be committed to a 
wrong, distorted, destructive principle of action and still have some mea-
sure of "wholeness" in their lives. One can readily imagine the Nazi 
whose life was integrated through a principled commitment to fascist ide-
ology. But this merely means that we must submit our commitments to 
criticism in terms of practical implications. In fact, any genuinely moral 
way of life "should include considerations as to what one thinks it impor-
tant to do and in what ways; how to conduct one's relations with other 
people; and being aware and prepared to be critical of one's basic 
approvals and disapprovals."ls Moral integrity entails a commitment to 
self-criticism insofar as being a self is bound to ground projects and orient-
ing goods. 
On first blush this act of self-criticism might seem to be what 
Scharlemann, following Martin Heidegger and Paul Tillich, means by "con-
science."19 On his account conscience testifies to the authenticity or 
inauthenticity of the self. In" conscience the self calls to itself; the self that is 
occupied with care calls to itself to be itself as I in the world (in Johannine 
language: to be in the world not of the world.)"2il Conscience can expose the 
inauthenticity of existence; the "I" calls to the self and convicts it of being 
lost in the world. But Scharlemann's reading misses an essential component 
of the concept of moral integrity. It does not mean "conscience" in the nar-
row sense of a call and accusation of the "I." And that is because integrity is 
a synthetic concept that articulates the relation between the wholeness of 
life and principled action. The wholeness of life is not defined as self-identi-
ty as is the case with Scharlemann's account of conscience, that is, the unity 
of the actual self with the "I" in the world. Rather, it means the integration 
of a variety of goods that can and ought to characterize personal and social 
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life. Moral integrity is concerned with the integration of various goods with 
respect to some principle of responsible action. 
As we will see later, this point about moral integrity must in fact be 
endorsed by Scharlemann. Although he is concerned about the unity of 
subjectivity, he is also interested in the relation between the forms of rea-
son, forms of relating self and other. One can safely assume that those rela-
tions manifest a variety of goods, goods like knowledge, moral account-
ability and loyalty, taste and beauty to name just a few. And if this is so, 
then one needs something like the concept of moral integrity in order to 
have a robust account of conscience.2! While the self might stand convicted 
or appear in the call of conscience with respect to its principle of act, how-
ever that principle is formulated, that does not exhaust the meaning of 
moral integrity. In fact, moral integrity, we can now say, relates human 
wholeness, the integration of goods basic to human activity, to some prin-
ciple for conduct and endorses a project of self-criticism, the work of con-
science, as basic to one's identity and moral community. 
The commitment to moral self-criticism, to the work of conscience, does 
not mean excessive scrupulosity; it does not require that a person or com-
munity be paralyzed by the demand to assess each and every intention 
and action. It does not deny the need for moral holidays, as William James 
called them. Self-criticism simply means that a person or community 
grasps that the examination of life is partly what makes life worth living; it 
endorses critical self-reflexivity as a genuine human good. Actually, 
Christian moral philosophy must link the Socratic demand for the exami-
nation of life with the works of love in order to give a full account of what 
kind of life is worth living. In any case, the point of moral criticism cannot 
be purely logical or transcendental in character. And this is because what 
we are concerned with is the effect of projects and commitments on the 
actual lives of agents, including those other than the person who is acting. 
The idea of moral integrity warrants criteria for validating claims, 
specifically the requirement to assess and evaluate ground projects in actu-
al human affairs. This does not require that the consequences of action 
alone validate the principle of self-criticism, as utilitarian forms of ethics 
argue. It does mean that the assessment of moral action is never devoid of 
attention to consequences. In exploring Scharlemann's work from this per-
spective, I am, then, asking about the principle of criticism basic to his 
account of human wholeness and the place for understanding and assess-
ing that wholeness in actual life. We are exploring what validates the rea-
son for following the christological summons. 
The history of ethics could be written with respect to the debate about 
how the principle of criticism of orienting goods is grounded and validat-
ed. In order to do so thinkers have appealed to the divine or the gods, 
social conventions and practices, the nature of reality, the consequence of 
actions and policies, and the autonomous, self-legislating "I". My task in 
this essay is by no means to write that history! Nor is that undertaking nec-
essary. In order to examine Scharlemann's work on this point, all one 
needs to do is to tum to Christian thought. One can explore how theolo-
gians have thought about the wholeness of life with respect to principles of 
action. This line of inquiry is possible because, as we will see, Scharlemann 
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is articulating one of the central options in Christian theology. 
Thus far I have merely clarified the idea of moral integrity and the kind 
of ground project it endorses. That project is characterized by self-critical 
understanding with respect to the effects of human action on the integra-
tion of the variety of goods in personal and social life. And I have noted 
the analogy between moral integrity and the idea of conscience as 
Scharlemann develops it. With these matters in hand, I want now to situ-
ate Scharlemann's argument in the history of Christian reflection on free-
dom and human wholeness. 
Christian Faith And Moral Integrity 
Theologians have always been careful to argue that Christian faith does not 
fundamentally change the content of valid moral claims. Of course, some 
thinkers, notably S0ren Kierkegaard whom Scharlemann cites on this 
point, contend that faith can entail a "teleological suspension" of the ethi-
cal. Faith is an end or good beyond the ethical. But that does not negate 
the point: the content of the ethical remains for the Christian even if there 
might be a good beyond the ethical. It would be rather odd, in other 
words, if one were to argue that Christian faith entails a less noble vision of 
human life than other belief systems. Even Kierkegaard, after all, argues 
that Christians are committed to works of love. 
This point is affirmed throughout the Christian and Jewish traditions. 
For instance, the giving of the law at Sinai is simultaneous with the 
redemption or liberation of the Hebrews from Egypt (Ex 20: 19-20). 
Theologians have always argued that the intelligibility of the moral law, 
especially precepts and commands concerning human relations, is not 
dependent on the event of redemption or revelation. Similarly, the revela-
tory event or the redeemer might radicalize moral demands with respect to 
his followers. Virtually every known culture and certainly the world's 
major religious traditions affirm a principle of reciprocity in the moral life. 
This is articulated in the so-called "Golden Rule." Jesus radicalizes this 
rule in his injunction to love even the enemy, a command that culminates 
in the demand to be perfect as God is perfect (Mt 5: 43-48). 
Granting these nuances, theologians have never argued that revelation 
alters the content of basic moral values and obligations. To deny this is to 
invite antinomianism: the belief that true believers are freed from the 
demands and obligations of the moral life. To forestall that conclusion, the 
contention has been that through grace the Christian is enabled and 
empowered to live out the moral life. Redemption and faith impinge on the 
moral life not in terms of the base requirements of morality, but, rather, in 
terms of a person's capacity and willingness to fulfill those requirements. 
And surely this is what Scharlemann means when he says that in following 
one is free to be in the world wholly. That statement cannot possibly mean 
that one is free to be in the world wholly without respect to the demands 
and possibilities of cognitive, moral, and aesthetic claims. Freedom and 
wholeness must be understood with respect to these other claims of reason. 
This is yet another clue that "wholeness," as Scharlemann intends it, must 
be defined in terms of the integration of a variety of goods in human life. 
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However, matters do not stop there. Were that the case, Christian faith 
would simply be morality's helpmeet. Faith would help us put our hearts 
in the moral project, but it would not, in principle, contribute to the ground 
or good of that project.22 The Christian would be free to be in the world 
wholly, but what "being in the world" means and what freedom requires 
would be specified without reference to the content of faith. One could 
reduce theological claims to ethical ones, or, more pointedly, completely 
forego theological matters in ethics. Theologians have rightly rejected this 
conclusion. The reason for not accepting it is quite simple. The good of 
human existence from a theological point of view must be understood in 
terms of the human relation to the divine. By exploring the human relation 
to the divine, the theologian is examining the totality of the moral life. In 
Scharlemann's terms, moral reflection in this tradition is also a mode of 
thinking. It is thinking the being of God as the highest good.23 
Theologians, historically speaking, have then agreed on at least two 
basic points. First, they have insisted that Christian faith does not violate 
the dictates of morality. Yet, second, theologians have also insisted that the 
demands of morality do not exhaust the meaning of Christian faith or its 
import for human life. The religious life exceeds the reach of morality inso-
far as God and the purposes of God rather than human actions and rela-
tions is the true focus of faith. Granting these two points, the agreement 
among theologians comes to an end. And it ends, interestingly enough, 
with respect to "where" human wholeness is located in relation to faith in 
the God of Jesus Christ. Let me explain this point because it is basic to 
Scharlemann's position. 
In Western Christianity it is a safe generalization to say that two widely 
different conceptions of the human relation to the divine of have been used 
with respect to the moral life. First, traditional Roman Catholic theology 
(say, Thomas Aquinas) asserted that the human relation to the divine, and 
thus the human good, requires the infusion of specifically theological 
virtues (faith, hope, and love) and these virtues, especially love, animate 
the moral life of Christians. These virtues are required since without them 
human beings cannot attain the supreme good, the vision of God. To be 
sure, individuals seemingly can acquire natural virtues Gustice, prudence, 
temperance, courage) without the infusion of grace, but from a Christian 
perspective, as both Augustine and Aquinas asserted, love, caritas, is actu-
ally the root of all of the virtues.24 Through grace, Aquinas argued, the 
Christian has infused into her or his life a new law or principle of action, 
the law of love. Both the capacity to act (theological virtues) and the prin-
ciple for action (the law of love) are given by grace. There is a unity of the 
virtues in caritas even as this infused love is a principle of action. The 
virtues must be "formed" by love. 
In traditional Roman Catholic ethics, caritas as a theological virtue 
denotes the integrity of life, as I have developed this concept.2S It specifies 
the wholeness of life, the integration of a diversity of goods and excel-
lences, with respect to a principle of action. The believer's moral life, her or 
his being in the world as an agent, is dependent on grace and it yet also 
contributes to the ongoing perfection or sanctification of life. Through the 
infusion of virtue, the "place" of human wholeness is therefore in the self 
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even if the perfection of this is found only in the vision of God. As 
Aquinas puts it, "the created intellect sees the divine substance through the 
divine essence as through something other than itself."26 Through grace 
the self, the "mind," is conformed to its ultimate object, to God. The 
virtues are part and parcel of that active process of conformity to the high-
est good who is God. 
Classical Protestant thought offers a different account, a difference seen 
in Scharlemann's work. The Protestant contention is that through grace 
the believer is freed from the unending aspiration of human beings to 
make themselves acceptable to others and to God. Because of the merit of 
Christ communicated to believers in faith, the divine counts as righteous 
those who are still in sin. Freed from the demand to justify one's self, the 
believer is freed to love and to serve others. Faith is not a virtue infused 
into the soul of the believer enabling him or her to do meritorious works. 
It is, rather, trust in the promise of God in Christ that frees the believer for 
moral action in the world. But this means, as Luther usually put it, that 
through faith the Christian exists in Christ. Christian righteousness, the 
authentic existence of faith, is alien. As Luther wrote in the 1535 commen-
tary on Galatians: 
By faith alone, not by faith formed by love, are we justified. We must 
not attribute the power of justification to a "form" that makes a man 
pleasing to God; we must attribute it to faith, which takes hold of 
Christ the Savior Himself and possesses Him in the heart."27 
Contrary to virtue theory, "righteousness is not in us in a formal sense, as 
Aristotle maintains, but is outside of us, solely in the grace of God and in His 
imputation."28 
On this account, the Christian's existence is constituted in the time and 
place of the act of faith. The integrity of life is in another (in Christ) 
through faith. The Christian exists in this world as sinful and saved, but 
through grace is free servant of all within the specific demands of his or her 
earthly calling or vocation. One is free to be in the world wholly as moth-
er, teacher, magistrate, or whatever. But this freedom contributes in no 
way to one's standing before God. That condition is only definable with 
respect to one's relation to Christ, to being in Christ through faith. 
My task here, again, is not to explore the history of Christian thought on 
these matters. The idea to grasp is that the place of the wholeness of life is 
conceived and symbolized differently in various strands of the Christian 
tradition, formally in the self through the virtue of love to be perfected in 
the vision of God or, conversely, in Christ through faith. Scharlemann, I 
judge, seeks to articulate the claim about "alien" existence present in 
Protestant thought. The complexity of his work is that he aims to specify 
philosophically the locality, the place, of human wholeness in freedom. 
Since the self is always somewhere, this means that the whole self, human 
wholeness, must be located somewhere. Scharlemann insists that the 
christological call is the "confrontation of the I with the I in another place 
that is the self's own peace, its own being whole."29 The confrontation of 
the "I" with itself outside of itself is the "place" of the self's own peace. 
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And this peace, Scharlemann argues, is what gives the self the freedom to 
be in the world wholly. The "place" of human wholeness is in the message 
announced in the acoluthetic summons, the message of peace. Human 
peace is not in the world even though it warrants us being wholly in the 
world. Seen historically, this is a traditional Lutheran theological claim 
about alien existence. 
Beginning with an observation about the moral "space" of life and 
regions of care, I have argued that the idea of "integrity" helps us articulate 
the relation between the wholeness of life and the question of the criterion 
for judging any actual form of human wholeness as worthy of our follow-
ing. The idea of moral integrity clarifies what is submerged in 
Scharlemann's appeals to "wholeness" and being in the world wholly. It 
clarifies a hidden criterion in his argument that I have provisionally 
defined as being true to self in wholeness. Likewise, we have seen that 
there are divergent streams in the Christian tradition on the question of 
"place" of human wholeness. Scharlemann's work, I have suggested, is an 
expression of the classical Protestant, Lutheran stream of Christian 
thought. I have, then, prepared the ground conceptually and historically 
for exploring Scharlemann's argument. Let us turn now to that task. Only 
after examining his work in detail will it be possible to return to the theme 
of moral integrity and its place in Christian moral philosophy. 
The Christological Summons And The Forms Of Reason 
As noted before, Scharlemann seeks to isolate a form of reason that has 
hitherto been unidentified in Western thought. He calls this form of reason 
"acoluthetic" reason, the reason of following. As Scharlemann notes, the 
"christological relation, constituted by the self's 'following' of another, is 
distinct from science, morality, and art; it is a rational form of its own."30 
He begins the demonstration of this remarkable thesis by exploring the 
subjectivity of the self, the "I" as such. 
As Scharlemann notes, the "I" can be examined in a number of ways. 
He explores three ways in particular: the project of radical doubt in know-
ing; in the attack of conscience and the possibility of trust; and in being-
towards-death as authentic self-understanding. There are a couple of rea-
sons why this way of beginning his inquiry is important. First, 
Scharlemann is seeking to isolate the ways in which the self appears for 
philosophical reflection. The self can appear in doubt and thus with 
respect to the grounds of cognitive claims. It can appear in the claim of 
conscience and so in the call of the self to itself. And the self appears with 
respect to the question of its authenticity before death. In each case, the 
question of the self is posed with respect to itself and what is other than 
self (truth, goodness, finitude). And this is essential to the systematic struc-
ture of Scharlemann's work. Reason is simply a way of relating self and 
other. As he notes, the "principle that we are using here is that of the self 
relating itself to its other." The "systematic structure should exhibit in a 
formal articulation all of the possible ways in which the self can be related 
to its other."31 In a moment we will explore this structure with respect to 
the forms of reason. But what we must initially note is that the self appears 
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with respect to questioning-the question entailed in doubting, in the call 
of conscience, or the question of authenticity in the face of finitude. What 
has not been explored is whether the self appears not only in questioning, 
but also in a message, a summons. Scharlemann will argue that this is so 
and that it is basic to acoluthetic reason. 
This brings us to the second important point about beginning the 
inquiry with the self. As we have already seen, Scharlemann argues that 
the self is always some "where"; it has spatial and also temporal location. 
The "place" of the self differs with respect to how the question of the self is 
raised. The self that appears in doubting is "located" within the domain of 
the world of cognition. The self that appears in the claim of conscience 
exists in a world of moral relations and norms. And the self that appears 
in the question of its authenticity is located in the world in being-towards-
death. The problem of the location of the self is of central importance to 
Scharlemann's argument for christological reason. For him, the "place" of 
the reason of following is defined not by a space of cognitive, moral, and 
aesthetic relations, but in the message it bears, the message of human 
wholeness. As he writes commenting on the sending of the Seventy in St. 
Luke's Gospel, 
The existence peculiar to those who are sent is an existence in a 
message. They are who they are only in the message they bring; they 
exist only as ones who speak and hear a peace in and with the words; 
they are who they are in the words in which they dwell by saying 
and hearing.32 
In a word, the" self" is examined by Scharlemann with respect to the unity 
of pure subjectivity (the "I") and its location (the self exists somewhere). 
We can say, then, that every act of reason is a configuration of the self's 
relation to some other in some place. Insofar as we think at all, the self is 
related to its other. The ego, Scharlemann insists, "is always a thinking 
self, that is, a self relating itself to its other."33 Abstractly put, thinking 
"means the opening of the mind to what is other than the mind and the 
synthesizing of the opposite elements that constitute that other."34 This def-
inition of thinking, we should note, raises a number of interesting philo-
sophical questions.35 What is meant by "mind?" How does the other 
remain other when the mind is synthesizing its constitutive elements? 
What are the constraints, if any, on the mind's synthesizing act, and thus 
the relation of self and other? Sadly, we cannot pursue these questions. 
Suffice it to say that Scharlemann insists on the irreducibility and centrality 
of the thinking subject in all rational relations. The 'T' might be constitut-
ed by its relation to its other, but insofar as that relation is rational the mind 
is active as well. 
What is important for Scharlemann is not the question of the meaning of 
"mind," but, rather, isolating the most fundamental modes of relating self to 
other. He argues that thinking can take either the mode of an understand-
ing of being or that of trusting in God. These are irreducible modes of 
thinking since they specify the horizon for any specific act of reasoning 
(cognitive, moral, existential). The act of understanding unites the singular 
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and universal, percept and concept. In order to understand any "thing" 
we must unite it with some general concept. I understand some perceptible 
object as a "dog" by uniting a perception with a concept (dog). This also 
means that in every act of thinking we seek to understand something and 
therefore some claim about being is implied in all acts of understanding.36 
Understanding, as Scharlemann argues, always posits a ground, that upon 
which some specific thing or event is dependent. Every act of understand-
ing something as meaningful is, at least implicitly, about being. That thing 
is a dog. What I am called to respect is a person. 
What about the act of trusting, the mode of believing? Scharlemann 
argues that 
to believe God is to unite a singular and a universal (or a counterpart 
to the singular and universal of being) by reference to "God." What 
then suggests itself as the mode of thinking called "faith" is the unity 
of a particular self with the universality of selfhood as such.37 
Understanding is about being. Trusting, the act of faith, refers to God and 
so the very self of myself, as Augustine might put it. This does not mean 
that "God" is a particular "self," since that would reduce God to a self 
among other selves and, what is more, never warrant my obedience. Yet 
"God" is also not the universality of selfhood. That is to say, God is not the 
mere idea of selfhood as such; such a god, maybe the god of the philoso-
phers, could never be the object of my trust. Scharlemann's claim is a com-
plex one. As he puts it, what "we notice, or acknowledge, is always an ego 
there-now; what we assent to is a form of community of selfhood; and the 
unity of the two in trust is the trust of the self in God."38 In other words, 
trust in "God" is the unity of my acknowledgment of my own particularity 
(same said for others about themselves) and my assent to a community of 
selves. If thinking is a schematizing act of the self's openness to the other, 
then the mode of thinking called faith relates ego and community of self-
hood as trust in God. To use biblical language, in faith I trust that I and all 
other persons are children of God. 
In terms of the human subject, the two modes of thinking (understand-
ing; faith) and thus being and selfhood implicate each other. And this has 
profound implications for philosophical theology. God as the one in whom 
I trust is only understood with respect to understanding being; under-
standing anything as existing is at least implicitly always open to the ques-
tion of that in which the self trusts. This means, according to Scharlemann, 
that "faith in God is interpreted by the understanding of being. The con-
verse is also true."39 The "seeking" of faith for understanding, as 
Augustine put it, is an interpretive process between these two modes of 
thinking. Philosophical theology is defined by this interpretive process. 
The primal modes of thinking (understanding and faith) as the self's 
relation to its other are configured in the forms of reason mentioned above 
(cognitive, moral, aesthetic). It is essential to grasp Scharlemann's argu-
ment at this point if we are to explore the connection between the christo-
logical reason and moral integrity. So, first, theoretical reason, 
Scharlemann argues, is the relation of self to natural being in which the self 
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is forgetful of itself and the other is posited as an "it." In the act of theoreti-
cal reason we posit claims about something objective to ourselves; this 
positing requires that we forget our self-interest. Theoretical reason neces-
sarily effaces the self out of concern to posit and test claims about concep-
tual or empirical objects of knowledge. In this sense, the self only appears 
in theoretical acts of reasoning in the act of positing claims about what is 
not self. It is because of this that theoretical reason can and does aspire to 
objectivity with respect to its claims. 
In aesthetic reason, Scharlemann argues that the relata enacted in think-
ing are personal beings, but the self identifies itself with the other that 
appeals to it. The self is ecstatic or outside of itself in aesthetic experience. 
When I encounter the work of art, read a text, behold the beauty of another 
or the starry heavens above, I am outside of myself. I experience an identi-
fication of myself with the other. My concern is not, as in theoretical rea-
son, to posit claims about what is other than myself. Rather, I experience 
aesthetic non-differentiation, as Hans-Georg Gadamer has called it, 
between myself and the other!O The division of self and other, subject and 
object, is transcended, at least for a moment. The self is not effaced in the 
act of cognition through the act of positing, rather the self is united with its 
other. I do not understand myself in the other; I am ecstatically one with 
the other. 
According to Scharlemann, in moral reason persons interact through 
respect in which they retain difference and freedom. The experience of 
respect discloses a relation of self and other in which the worth and differ-
ence of each is recognized and acknowledged. In moral reason I am not 
positing claims about something, whether that is an object of pure thinking 
or some empirical object in the world. In moral reason the self encounters 
what is other than itself and this encounter is characterized by respect. 
Scharlemann's point is essentially a Kantian one. What I respect in the 
other or myself is the humanity present in persons, a humanity defined by 
rational freedom. But the fact that what I respect in others is also the object 
of respect in myself does not efface the difference between self and other. 
For what I respect is precisely the humanity in the other person and not 
simply our shared commonality. This is important for understanding the 
difference Scharlemann draws between moral reason and aesthetic reason. 
In aesthetic reason there is an identification of self and other. In moral rea-
son, self and other remain distinct but related through respect. 
The question Scharlemann poses is whether or not these three exhaust 
the possible forms of reason. He argues that there is a distinctive form of 
reason unaccounted for in theoretic, aesthetic, and moral forms of reason. 
This form of reason must be specified in terms other than the act of posit-
ing, ecstatic identification, or respect. Scharlemann, we know, specifies a 
different form of reason through the act of following, a form of reason that 
appears in response to a call to follow another. This form of reason is man-
ifest for Christians in the call of Jesus to discipleshipY Scharlemann insists 
that the form of reason so disclosed is not exclusively Christian, since if 
that were so it could not be called a form of reason as such. In other words, 
there are other possible instances of a summons to follow (e.g., the 
Buddha). This form of reason must configure the modes of thinking and 
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thus be a form of understanding and a form of faith. 
What is the character of christological reason? And how is it related to 
and yet distinct from the other forms of reason? Scharlemann argues that 
the reason of following is a personal relation in which the self finds itself 
authentically in another. The self loses itself to find itself in the act of follow-
ing another. In this form of reason, the self is summoned to follow the 
appearance of the "I" (pure subjectivity) outside of itself. "Thus, the acolu-
thetic form of reason is the one in which the I in its most intimate selfhood is 
related to its own intimacy outside."42 Put differently, Scharlemann devel-
ops the idea of ecstatic reason, as found in the work of Paul Tillich, to its full 
christo logical and phenomenological implications. Christological reason is 
a distinct form for understanding being (the I outside itself) and also trust-
ing in God (following) in which the identity of God and "I" appear. 
Scharlemann's argument at this juncture is confusing. If not careful, he 
could be taken to assert the unity of God and the "I" such that any theologi-
cal distinction is obliterated. While true of some other religions and also 
forms of mysticism, the identification of the "I" and God does not remain 
within the bounds of biblical faith. And if Scharlemann's argument is for a 
unity of God and I, then my own proposal for moral integrity radically 
negates his position. But it seems to me that Scharlemann, and certainly 
my argument, is making a different point that in fact insists on the theolog-
ical difference. The self is constituted and defined in and through its rela-
tion to the divine, a relation defined by faith or unbelief. In faith the self is 
in another, but it never becomes the other. This is to argue, along with St. 
Augustine in the Confessions, that God is really nearer to me than I am to 
myself. The kind of reflexive thinking explored and advocated in this 
essay depends on that insight. Insofar as human subjectivity is constituted 
most radically in relation to or a denial of the divine, then it is correct, as 
Scharlemann contends, to say that the self authentically comes to itself in 
God. This fact in no way denies or qualifies the theological difference; the 
self can never be self-constituting. Only God is God. I take it that this is 
also the point of Scharlemann's attempt to isolate a distinctive form of rea-
son in which the self is in another, in Christ. And this is the point, of 
course, of speaking about Christian moral philosophy. The enterprise of 
ethics is radically transformed once the very being of the moral agent is 
and must be conceived theologically, in relation to God. The moral life is 
not an end in itself; it is responsive to the being and activity of God who 
alone is the real integrity of life. 
Now, based on the systematic structure of Scharlemann's work, it is 
rather simple to specify the difference between the reason of following and 
the other forms of reason. Unlike theoretical reason, the reason of follow-
ing does not posit an object but is summoned to follow another; in follow-
ing the self is lost but also finds its authentic identity. Unlike aesthetic rea-
son, the exstantial I, as Scharlemann calls it, is indeed ecstatically outside of 
itself. But the self does not lose itself in aesthetic non-differentiation with 
other. The self is at one with its essential self. Unlike moral reason, the 
relation of the self to itself outside of itself in christological reason is not 
one of respect, since the relation of the self and the exstantial I is character-
ized by identity and not difference. Christological reason has analogies to 
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the other forms of reason but precisely because of this it is also differentiat-
ed from them. If I understand him rightly, the analogical relation among 
the forms of reason is crucial to Scharlemann's argument. Only by estab-
lishing the irreducibility of christological reason to any other form of rea-
son is it possible to establish and justify Christian philosophical theology on 
rational grounds while remaining a form of faith. 
One major contribution of Scharlemann's work is to press this point 
about validity and to attempt to answer it. The difficulty, of course, is not 
simply to show the logical possibility of this form of reason. That alone 
would not establish the argument, because, we should recall, thinking 
entails a relation of self to other. In order to establish this argument 
Scharlemann must specify how the "I" outside of myself is encountered in 
a way other than doubt, conscience, or being-towards-death. The conun-
drum Scharlemann faces in answering this question ought not to be over-
looked. Since an encounter of the self with its other must take place some-
where, Scharlemann must specify the unique locality of the christological 
summons. Theoretical relations, as we have seen, take place in the space of 
pure cognition or the world of empirical objects. The moral relation takes 
place with respect to concrete other persons in the world. And the space of 
aesthetic reason is constituted by the work of art, the world projected by 
the text in which I might dwell, as Paul Ricoeur puts it.43 If christological 
reason is characterized bv the self's relation to itself outside of itself, where 
is that self? In what place does that encounter happen? How are we to 
show that this place, however designated, is not in fact definable in terms 
of the place of the other forms of reason and thus, again, reduce christo-
logical reason back into theoretical, moral, or aesthetic reason? And if that 
is true, is philosophical theology as Scharlemann defines it really possible? 
Scharlemann acknowledges that we do in fact have experiences of others 
calling us to follow in the domain of mundane relations. But he argues that 
the reason of following is not in principle limited to personal encounters. It 
can also take place in the medium of "textuality". The written text, he con-
tends, is a located self-understanding other than our own. A text gives 
"place" to a being that is with us in the world so that he, she, or it can be 
known, identified with, respected, or followed. If this is so, then in principle 
it is possible to constitute a rational relation, a relation of self to other, 
through the text. The "voice" who summons me to follow inscribed in the 
text can be encountered as a reality. The exstantiall, the 1 outside of the self 
in which the self finds itself, can be encountered not only in another person, 
or the representation of a person from the past, but in a text. The place of 
christological reason is the world of textuality.44 The self encounters its 
wholeness, its peace, in the "place" of the acoluthetic message. But this mes-
sage is simply the message of wholeness as the possibility of being in the 
world freely. The self is in the place of the message of wholeness and peace. 
It is hard to imagine a stronger argument in contemporary philosophi-
cal theology for a version of the classical Protestant principle of sola scrip-
tura. As noted, in traditional Lutheran theology the believing self has alien 
existence; it is in the Christ whom scripture bears. In faith the self exists in 
another, in Christ, and in so acting is counted righteous by God while 
remaining a sinner. This means, furthermore, that the 'T' is in the world, 
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that is, the self is situated in the domain of relations specified by the other 
forms of reason, but is not of the world in that it is constituted in the chris-
tological relation. What defines these texts as scripture is, then, that they 
''bear'' Christ ("was Christum treibt") and in faith the Christian's existence 
is constituted in the Christ presented in scripture. One's existence is alien 
in that what constitutes the identity of the self is not in the self but the exs-
tantial I. 
Scharlemann's argument is a philosophical expression of the clas-
sical Pauline dictum of being "in Christ." His important caveat is to insist 
that being in Christ, the reason of following, is actually the exstantial 1. 
Why is that important to assert? It is important because only in showing 
that what calls the self to follow is the I itself is there any answer to the 
question noted above: why should I follow? I should follow the call of the 
exstantial I because in doing so I am constituted as a self. I am, we might 
say, born anew from above. The problem of the self's relation to itself is 
answered. I am free to be in the world wholly; the unity of subjectivity 
enables me to accept the fragmentariness and travail of finite life. To bor-
row again from Paul Tillich, one has the courage to be in the face of the 
threat of non-being. 
What are we to make of this argument? I have tried to isolate the sys-
tematic structure of Scharlemann's position with respect to the forms of 
reason. And I have also tried to confirm several points made in the previ-
ous sections of this essay: (1) wholeness is the christological criterion; (2) 
this criterion entails some construal of the world with respect to an idea 
about how to orient our lives; (3) the "place" of human wholeness is the 
christological summons; and, (4) this warrants a specific life project, to be 
in the actual world wholly. If I am correct on these points, then I want to 
return to the discussion of moral integrity. 
Moral Integrity And The Reason For Following 
The question that Scharlemann's work poses is whether or not his concep-
tion of human wholeness makes sense. Put most boldly, if the self is 
abstracted from its constitutive cognitive, moral, and aesthetic relations 
and the values and commitments these entail in the relating of self and 
other, what is actually being made "whole?" How does the reason of fol-
lowing not entail a denial of the goods found in the other forms of reason? 
And if the peace of the self is a place other than that in which the problem 
of human wholeness arises, that is, the worlds of cognitive, moral, and aes-
thetic relations, how does this answer the dilemma of our being in the 
world, a world divided and in conflict? I judge that Scharlemann would 
answer this series of questions along the following lines. 
The freedom of following is that "we come to be whole on our own in 
the world."45 Freedom and being whole cannot be interpreted in individu-
alistic terms even if their core meaning is the unity of subjectivity. On strict-
ly systematic grounds, a worldless self-identity, an identity that does not 
entail relations of self and other, is problematic for understanding the peace 
or being whole entailed in following. In fact, such an identity is, strictly 
speaking, unthinkable since thinking, per definition, is on Scharlemann's 
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account the relation of self and other. Moreover, the self is always some-
where, it has location. But if that is so, then the event of the I outside itself is 
not simply a self-identical I at peace with itself, but, rather, an "I" bound to 
a condition or message in which the self and, in principle, all others may 
graciously exist. This can neither be the actual, empirical world of everyday 
life, Scharlemann would continue, which is hardly characterized by 
"peace," nor can it be the "world" disclosed by the other forms of reason, 
the worlds of pure cognition, respect for others, or being-towards-death 
marked, respectively, by doubt, the sting of conscience, and inauthentic 
existence. It can only be the "world" presented or displayed by Christ call-
ing me to follow, the acoluthetic summons. The "I" is located in the world 
of the message and is then freed to exist wholly in the world of actual life. In 
faith one is freed to be active in the world in all the domains of reason since 
the world of actual relations is not the place for realizing authentic exis-
tence. Christian faith is not "formed" by love; it grasps Christ and exists in 
the imputation of grace freed to love others, and radically so. 
I have constructed this Scharlemannian response to my queries in order 
to raise a problem. The imagined response requires, again on purely sys-
tematic grounds, that we explore not only the peace of the authentic self, 
but also the peace of the world announced in the summons to follow. 
Insofar as the self is always some where, then in exploring the peace of the 
self we must explore the "world" in which it exists. We have returned, in 
other words, to the theme of how the self orients itself in the world, the 
moral space of life. On Scharlemann's terms this point must be formulated 
as follows: how does the self orient itself in the world displayed by the aco-
luthetic summons? How does this world, this space, relate to the "worlds" 
disclosed by the other forms of reason? 
Now, to answer that question, as Scharlemann does, by saying that one 
is free to be in the world wholly in the message of peace is actually to mis-
take the consequence of following for its ground. That is, to be in the world 
freely is the consequence of following. The ground of following, converse-
ly, must be fidelity to the acoluthetic summons, a response of commitment, 
the consequence of which is the distinctive freedom to be in the world 
wholly. If this is so, then some principled act, some commitment to a 
ground project and orienting good, is intrinsic to very idea of human 
wholeness. And that means, as I noted at the outset of this inquiry, that the 
idea of integrity, not simple wholeness or identity, is required in this argu-
ment in order to avoid self-refutation. The wholeness of life is related to 
some principled action, some commitment or ground project; freedom to 
be in the world wholly is the consequence of that commitment. And that 
ground project, I contend, must endorse the integration of the complexity 
of goods that characterize finite, worldly existence displayed in the other 
forms of reason, the other ways of relating self and other in the world. 
Granting this argument, as I judge we must, has important implications 
for understanding human existence. The reason for this is simple. By the 
term moral integrity we mean to designate a commitment to self-criticism 
insofar as being a self is bound to ground projects and orienting goods. 
Moral integrity endorses a project of self-criticism as basic to one's identity 
and the identity of any valid moral community. But what is the principle 
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of self-criticism for a form of life constituted by the acoluthetic summons?46 
Once we see the need for the idea of moral integrity because the acoluthetic 
summons is correlated to an orienting commitment, then the criterion can-
not be simply the self's peace with itself nor even the peace of the world 
manifest in the christological summons. Insofar as we are interested in the 
integration of a variety of goods with respect to a ground project that 
defines a person's or community's sense of what life is about, then the cri-
terion must in fact include the values endorsed in the other forms of rea-
son. In the name of the integrity of reason, christo logical claims must be 
subject to theoretical, practical, and aesthetic criteria. And by the same 
token, christological reason must ground and even transform our commit-
ment to the goods entailed in the other forms of reason. And of these is it 
not the case that the moral criterion (say, to respect and to enhance the 
integrity of life) is necessarily foremost? For what conceivable peace, free-
dom, or wholeness could violate that criterion and still provide us with 
valid reasons for foIIowing? How does the christological summons 
ground and transform the moral claim? 
What I am arguing is that the idea of acoluthetic reason must endorse as 
the criteria for its own criticism the validity of claims and goods implicit in 
the other forms of reason or it fails to provide valid reasons for following. 
If this is the case, then one needs a concept to relate the idea of wholeness 
with principled action. That concept is moral integrity. This concept, I am 
suggesting, fills a gap in Scharlemann's argument about the self. Put in 
strictly systematic terms, the idea of moral integrity within theological 
thinking is the means to interpret the moral import of faith in God, a mode 
of thinking about trust in God open to the question of being, with respect 
to the being of the self. It designates the wholeness of human existence 
through faith in God with respect to the principles endorsed in our cogni-
tive, moral, and aesthetic being in the world and the goods these forms of 
reason entail, goods like truth, beauty, and respect for persons. To use 
explicitly Christian talk, it is to grasp that Christ came so that one might 
have life and have it abundantly. 
What then does Scharlemann's argument contribute to the development 
of an adequate understanding of moral integrity? The integrity of the self, 
we can now see, cannot be understood only in terms of the goods and 
claims entailed in the other forms of reason. The integrity of the self must 
be understood in terms of the right integration of those goods with respect 
to the well-being of the self and others. But this means that the "self" is not 
definable in terms of those goods; it cannot be defined as pure knower, will-
ing and acting subject, or only in terms of aesthetic feeling alone. 
Rationalism, voluntarism, or aestheticism are inadequate pictures of human 
existence. The self must be defined by its commitment or lack of commit-
ment to the ground project of respecting and enhancing the manifold goods 
of life. The self is defined by its faith, that is, an identity conferring commit-
ment. That is the Protestant insight. And the "place" of the self must be 
within some encompassing community characterized by that project but 
not limited to selfhood as such. In undertaking that commitment the self is 
outside itself in fidelity to a commurtity called the reign of God. Put differ-
ently, the integral self cannot be simply the self's unity with the "I" manifest 
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in the christological summons. It must be the self dedicated to the project 
Christ announces, the project of the reign of God in the wide compass of 
life. That form of existence is the subject of moral integrity from the per-
spective of Christian moral philosophy, an enterprise now redeemed 
through the idea of moral integrity within the structure of reason. 
The act of fidelity that constitutes the self radically transforms attach-
ment to the range of goods that define the space of human life by locating 
existence in a distinctive space of relations, a community of the integrity of 
life as the reign of God. Scharlemann's argument contributes to an inquiry 
into moral integrity by reminding us that the self is not reducible to the 
goods and relations it must endorse and evaluate. Conversely, his claims 
about subjectivity are given content through the idea of moral integrity 
with respect to those goods and relations of the fom1s of reason. In a word, 
the idea of moral integrity enables us to explore the being of the self with 
respect to its relation to others configured in the forms of reason. Insofar as 
this is the case, reflection on moral integrity is a mode of thinking-a think-
ing about the being of the self in terms of faith in, commitment to, the reign 
of God. Yet it is also an exercise of practical reason since our concern is 
how to orient ourselves in the world. Moral integrity is the synthetic con-
cept at the crossing point of thinking and practical reasoning. It enables us 
to articulate a domain of existence and rationality uncharted by 
Scharlemann, and yet essential to his argument, in terms uniquely suited 
for the enterprise of Christian moral philosophy. 
Conclusion 
In this essay I have tried to develop the idea of moral integrity as impor-
tant for the structure of reason and philosophical theologyY In the 
process of doing so, this has required a shift in "where" the wholeness of 
life is to be found. The place of that wholeness can be nowhere else than in 
the commitment to the reign of God in the world. For in that reign the 
complexity of goods of the created order are rightly respected and 
enhanced. The integrity of life is bound to ground projects, to what we 
care about. To care about the world, to save it, rather than to condemn it, is 
surely the acoluthetic summons. It was what the Christ came to do. It is 
the only valid reason for following. 
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